We give a simpli ed proof of a theorem of Lagarias, Lenstra and Schnorr 17] that the problem of approximating the length of the shortest lattice vector within a factor of Cn, for an appropriate constant C, cannot be NP-hard, unless NP = coNP. We also prove that the problem of ndng a n 1=4 -unique shortest lattice vector is not NP-hard under polynomial time many-one reductions, unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses.
for any problem in NP. The next best thing to an absolute lower bound would be a proof of NP-hardness for breaking the protocol. To this end, Ajtai and Dwork 3] have proposed a public-key cryptosystem with provable security guarantees based on only the worst-case hardness assumption for an approximate version of the shortest lattice vector problem. More precisely, they de ned the notion of a n c -unique shortest lattice vector, and showed that for a certain c, if nding the shortest lattice vector in a lattice with a n c -unique shortest vector is hard in the worst case, then their public-key cryptosystem is provably secure. This is the rst public-key cryptosystem with such provable security guarantees. Hence there is considerable interest recently in the determination of the exact complexity for a variety of problems related to the shortest vector problem. In particular one would like to narrow the gap between those cases where NP-hardness can be proved and those where it is probably not NP-hard. Goldreich and Goldwasser have obtained the following result: Approximating the shortest lattice vector within a factor of O( p n= log n) is not NP-hard under polynomial time many-one reductions, assuming the polynomial time hierarchy does not collapse 9]. We adapt their proof to show that the problem of nding a n 1=4 -unique shortest lattice vector is not NP-hard under polynomial time many-one reductions, unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses.
Preliminaries
A lattice L (of full rank) in R n is the set of all integral linear combinations of a set of n linearly independent vectors in R n . Such a linearly independent set of generating vectors is called a basis for L. Basis vectors for a lattice are not unique, but related by unimodular transformations.
The dimension of a lattice L, denoted dim L, is the number of vectors in a basis. We denote the length (Euclidean norm) of a vector v by jjvjj. The inner product is denoted by hu; vi, and jjvjj 2 = hv; vi.
A fundamental theorem of Minkowski is the following:
Theorem 2.1 (Minkowski) There is a universal constant , such that for any lattice L of dimension n, 9v 2 L, v 6 = 0, such that jjvjj p n det(L) 1=n :
The determinant det(L) of a lattice is the volume of the n-dimensional fundamental parallelepiped, and the absolute constant is known as Hermite's constant. (Some authors de ne the least upper bound for jjvjj= det(L) 1=n or its square jjvjj 2 = det(L) 2=n as Hermite's constant n , then n is bounded above by p n or 2 n, respectively, for all lattices of dimension n, where is some universal constant.) We denote unit(L) = det(L) 1= dim(L) . We denote by 1 (L) the length of the shortest non-zero lattice vector of L. Then Minkowski's Theorem can also be stated as 1 
There is a second Minkowski theorem dealing with the geometric mean of the socalled successive minima n pQ n i=1 i in place of 1 Banaszczyk 6] , where the factor n 2 has been replaced by n.
for some universal constant C, and for all 1 i n and all n. Banaszczyk's proof is non-elementary, based on harmonic analysis. This bound of Cn is essentially optimal up to the constant C, since a construction by Conway and Thompson (see 21]) shows that there exists a self-dual lattice family fL n g with 1 (L n ) = ( p n).
3 A product relation Theorem 2.3 follows easily from Banaszczyk's inequality (Theorem 2.5). Even though Banaszczyk's inequality is stronger than that of Theorem 2.4, the bound to non-NP-hardness for approximability of shortest lattice problem remains O(n).
We will give a self-contained elementary proof of Theorem 2.3. The inequalities we prove are not as strong as Banaszczyk's inequality, but the proofs are much simpler, and yields the same bound O(n) for non-NP-hardness. We rst prove a lemma, which is modeled after a lemma of Ajtai 1] . The lemma is proved using Minkowski's First Theorem on shortest lattice vectors. Remark: The conditions k > 0 and k < n can be omitted in the statements if we understand that the statements are vacuously true for the cases where k = 0 or k = n respectively.
Proof: The lemma is trivially true for n = 1. We suppose n > 1, and prove by induction. The lemma is proved. 2 Returning to the proof of Theorem 3.2, we take the threshold t to be slightly less than bl(L)=cn. Then the integer k from Lemma 3.2 must be less than n, lest there be a basis of Proof: Suppose there is a polynomial-time Turing machine M reducing SAT to the problem of nding the length of the shortest lattice vector for a lattice of dimension n, within a factor of 2 n. The precise meaning of this reduction is in terms of the notion of a promise problem 23], where every oracle query by M consists of a lattice L and a threshold t, with the property that either the shortest lattice vector of L has length t (in which case the oracle answer is \yes"), or the length is > ( 2 dim L)t (in which case the oracle answer is \no"). The lattice L is presented to the oracle in terms of a basis. The dimension as well as the bit-length of the basis vectors of L are bounded by a xed polynomial of the input length to M, and each oracle query counts as one step by M.
We now describe an NP\coNP algorithm to solve SAT. Thus NP NP\coNP, and so NP = coNP. Upon any input boolean formula to M, we simulate M, where we handle each query as follows. Suppose L and a threshold t are presented. First let's suppose 1 (L) t, then we can guess a short non-zero vector of L, and verify that its length is at most t. It is not di cult to see that the bit-length of such a shortest vector in terms of the given basis vectors is polynomially bounded. Now suppose 1 (L) > t, then by hypothesis 1 (L) > ( 2 dim L)t. Apply Corollary 3.1 to the lattice L , we have 1 1 
> t. Thus, we simply guess an admissible sequence h 1 ; : : : ; dim L i of vectors for the dual lattice L , and verify that max i jj i jj < 1=t. Again it is not di cult to see that one can rst compute a dual basis from the basis given for L, and verify all the necessary requirements in polynomial time. In particular, the bit-length of such a guess is polynomially bounded. 2
As mentioned earlier, much of the recent interest in the complexity of problems related to shortest lattice vectors stems from the great advances made by Ajtai 1] , and Ajtai and Dwork 3]. In particular, the Ajtai-Dwork public-key cryptosystem is provably secure assuming only the worst case intractability of the following problem: Given a n-dimensional lattice L with a n c -unique shortest vector, for some large constant c, nd its shortest vector.
Ajtai 2] has shown more recently that the shortest lattice vector problem is NP-hard under randomized polynomial time reductions. In view of applications to cryptographic security, hardness for approximate versions of the shortest lattice vector problem are also important. To this end, Ajtai 2] showed that for a su ciently large but xed k, to approximate the length of the shortest lattice vector within a factor of 1 + 1 2 n k remains NP-hard under randomized polynomial time reductions. More precisely, this means that there is a probabilistic polynomial time reduction with the following property: Given an arbitrary boolean formula , ( ) is a lattice L with a threshold t, such that, if is satis able 2 SAT, then with high probability 1 (L) t, and if is not satis able 6 2 SAT, then 1 (L) > 1 + 1 2 n k t. Furthermore, given any approximate short vector v 2 L, with 0 < jjvjj 1 + 1 2 n k t, a satisfying assignment to can be easily constructed from v. This approximation factor has been improved by Cai and Nerurkar 8] to 1 + 1 n " , for any " > 0. The results discussed in this paper belong to the other direction, namely certain approximate shortest lattice vector problems are not NP-hard under some standard complexity assumptions. Going beyond the factor n, Goldreich and Goldwasser 9] have shown that approximating the shortest lattice vector within a factor of O( p n= log n) is not NP-hard under polynomial time many-one reductions, assuming the polynomial time hierarchy does not collapse. This is a stronger result of non-NP-hardness, assuming a stronger complexity assumption. More precisely they showed that there is a (bounded round) interactive proof system (AM) for the assertion that 1 (L) > t p n= log n, assuming that the lattice L sat-is es the promise that either 1 (L) t or 1 (L) > t p n= log n. The main consequence of the interactive proof is that unless the polynomial time hierarchy collapses, the following reduction ( ) = (L; t) does not exist in polynomial time: Given an instance for SAT, if 2 SAT, then 1 (L) t, and if 6 2 SAT, then 1 (L) > t p n= log n. The basic idea of the IP protocol of 9] is rather simple and beautiful that we describe it informally: Suppose L satis es the promise of either 1 (L) t or 1 (L) > t p n= log n, and the prover claims that 1 (L) > t p n= log n. Imagine we surround each lattice point p 2 L a ball B p (r) centered at p with radius r = t p n= log n=2. If the prover P is honest, then all such balls are disjoint. Now the veri er randomly picks a lattice point p in secret, and randomly picks a point z in B p (r). The veri er presents z to the prover, who should respond with p, the center of the ball from which z was chosen. It is clear that for an honest prover P with unlimited computing power, since all the balls B p (r) are disjoint, he has no di culty meeting his obligation. However, suppose the prover P' is dishonest, so that in fact 1 (L) t. Then for any lattice point p picked by the veri er, there is at least one nearby lattice point p 0 with jjp ? p 0 jj t. Then B p (r) and B p 0 (r) would have a large intersection. This follows from the fact that the radius is almost n 1=2 times the distance of their respective centers. It follows that there is a signi cant probability that a dishonest prover will be caught, since in case a point z 2 B p (r) \ B p 0 (r) is chosen, the veri er could equally have chosen p or p 0 .
The exponent 1=2 in this interactive proof protocol comes from the well known fact that in n-dimensional space, two unit balls with center distance d have a signi cant intersection if d < 1= p n, and a negligible intersection if d > 1=n 1=2? , for any > 0.
In view of the particular version of the shortest vector problem upon which the AjtaiDwork system is based, it is interesting to consider to which extent a non-NP-hardness result can be shown for it. De ne the following promise problem:
The n c -unique shortest lattice vector problem:
Given a lattice with a n c -unique shortest vector v, nd the shortest vector v. Proof: Let L be a lattice with a n 1=4 -unique shortest vector. We present a bounded round interactive proof system (AM) for proving that 1 (L) > t. Let accounts for the boundary of the large parallelepiped). In this case, i.e., conditional to an i and z ij 2 B p ij (r i ) \ Bp ij (r i ), any prover can achieve a success probability of at most 1=2 + e ?n c . We note that every try (every j) is independent, and the above estimate of 1=2 + e ?n c is valid conditional to any other tries. Compound this by m parallel tries, and summing over all i from 0 to log 2 T = n O(1) , we conclude that the success probability of any prover is exponentially small, no more than e ?n c 0 . Hence dishonest provers will be caught with probability exponentially close to one. 2
